Kentucky Law Survey: Domestic Relations by Wilson, Natalie S.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 65 | Issue 2 Article 9
1976
Kentucky Law Survey: Domestic Relations
Natalie S. Wilson
Eblen, Milner, Rosenbaum & Wilson
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wilson, Natalie S. (1976) "Kentucky Law Survey: Domestic Relations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 65 : Iss. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol65/iss2/9
Domestic Relations
NATALIE S. WILSON*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Kentucky was relatively active this
year in the field of domestic relations. Significant decisions
were rendered pertaining to child custody, adoption, modifica-
tion of separation agreements and child custody awards, and
marital property divisions. This article will delineate the major
cases in each of these areas. Many of the cases discussed in this
survey article were styled "memorandum per curiam" by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. This means that they have no
precedential value and are not to be cited as authority in any
court in Kentucky. Despite this lack of precedential value, this
article will discuss several of them for they furnish an indica-
tion of the present Court's thinking on domestic relations is-
sues. The footnotes will designate whether or not a case is
styled "memorandum per curiam."
I. CHILD CUSTODY
It is not feasible to review all the Kentucky decisions per-
taining to custody issues of the past year. However, some may
be of special interest to the practitioner.
In the last year the Court has held that the reports of social
workers on prospective homes for a child must be given to
the parties so that they may have an effective right to cross-
examine before an award of custody is given; that litigation
concerning the custody of a child should takeplace in the
jurisdiction in which the child and his family have the closest
connection; that all facts and circumstances of a particular
case will be examined to determine whether a child may move
with one parent to another jurisdiction; and finally that the
father of an illegitimate child is entitled to visitation privileges
with the child absent a showing that such a privilege would be
detrimental to the child's best interests.
* Partner, Eblen, Milner, Rosenbaum & Wilson, Lexington, Kentucky. A.B.
Smith College, 1954; J.D. University of Kentucky, 1968.
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A. Lewis v. Lewis: Reports of Social Workers
This case' involved an appeal from a circuit court judg-
ment awarding custody of a child to the mother. The custody
award was made on the basis of reports on the respective homes
of the mother and father by social workers. However, these
reports were not sent to the attorneys for the parties before the
award was made. Citing Kentucky Revised Statutes §
403.300(3)2 [hereinafter cited as KRS] the Court held that
when reports on homes are ordered by a court, the court in turn
must follow the statutory mandate and provide copies of the
reports to the parties involved. To do otherwise would prevent
effective cross-examination.' Furthermore, KRS § 403.300(3)
provides that a right to cross-examination cannot be waived
before a hearing, and in this case no hearing was provided by
the circuit court. In essence, Lewis holds that the statutory
provisions will have to be adhered to scrupulously when the
reports of social workers are used by a lower court to evaluate
the quality of a child's prospective home.
B. Barr v. Barr: The Appropriate Jurisdiction
Two recent cases have held that proceedings to modify
custody awards must be brought in the jurisdiction with which
the child and his family have the closest connection. In Barr
v. Barr,4 an action for modification of custody was brought in
Kentucky by the mother, who was a Kentucky resident. The
children had been residents of Indiana for the last 5 years, and
their only connection with Kentucky was through periodic vis-
itation with their mother. The Court examined the commis-
I Lewis v. Lewis, 534 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1976).
2 Ky. Ray. STAT. § 403.300(3) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides:
The clerk shall mail the investigator's report to counsel and to any party not
represented by counsel at least 10 days prior to the hearing. The investigator
shall make available to counsel and to any party not represented by counsel
the investigator's file of underlying data, and reports, complete texts of
diagnostic reports made to the investigator pursuant to the provisions of
subsection (2), and the names and addresses of all persons whom the investi-
gator has consulted. Any party to the proceeding may call the investigator
and any person whom he has consulted for cross-examination. A party may
not waive his right of cross-examination prior to the hearing.
Lewis v. Lewis, 534 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1976) at 802.
No. 75-503 (November 14, 1975) (mem. per curiam).
[Vol. 65
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sioners' comment to Sections 1(a)(3) and 3(a)(2) of the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 5 and stated:
One of the general legislative purposes of KRS 403.260(1)(b)
is to assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child
take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where significant evi-
dence concerning his care, protection, training and personal
relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this
state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and
his family have a closer connection with another state.
Wells v. Monti6 involved a similar fact pattern where the
father was seeking to modify the award of custody to the
mother. Here the child had lived out of Kentucky for 10 years
with the exception of periodic summer visits with the father.
The Court held that:
A Kentucky court should not entertain a motion to change
the custody of a child who has been a resident of another state
for more than 6 months unless special circumstances exist.
KRS § 403.260. None of these special circumstances are pres-
ent in this case.7
Essentially, the lower court had found that even though the
evidence showed that the child had emotional problems, no
evidence existed proving that the problems were the result of
mistreatment, abuse or neglect, and the Supreme Court
adopted this finding.
Both Barr and Monti rest on the rationale that a court
deciding whether to modify a custody award must have
"optimum access" to all the facts of the particular action. This
is why proceedings to modify custody awards must be brought
in the jurisdiction with which the child and his family have the
closest connection. If a child has lived outside of Kentucky for
more than 6 months, only special circumstances will allow the
I Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act §§ 1(a)(3), 3(a)(2) (Commissioners'
Comment) (emphasis added).
No. 75-1001 (March 19, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
Id. at 2. These "special circumstances" are outlined in KRS § 403.260(c)(2). The
Court can assume jurisdiction if: "It is necessary in an emergency to protect him
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is
neglected or dependent. .. ."
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trial court to assume jurisdiction of the matter. Otherwise, the
party seeking to modify the award must bring suit in the juris-
diction where the child resides.
In the preceding cases, the Kentucky courts were ruling on
cases raised under.KRS § 403.260(1)(a) which asserted juris-
diction to make a custody determination if this state had been
the child's home state within 6 months before commencement
of the proceeding. That statute was amended in 1976 to remove
the requirement that the child must have been a resident
within the past 6 months and to adopt statutorily the uniform
goals of significant contacts or, as the commissioners put it,
"closer connection."
C. Early v. Early: Moving from the Jurisdiction
Responding to the demands of an increasingly mobile pop-
ulation, the Supreme Court held' that a mother who had pre-
viousl been given custody of the children could, upon an ade-
quate showing that it was beneficial to the children, move to
another jurisdiction. Here the trial court had rather cryptically
referred to the father's "not too impressive demeanor" on the
witness stand, and to the fact that "the kind of life her ex-
husband is living with Vicki Smith is not for the best interest
of the children."9
The lower court also found positive reasons for such a
move, including a desire on the part of the mother "[t]o get
away from the people she and her ex-husband knew for a period
of years and try to start life over;"10 that she had a good job
waiting for her where she moved; and that her brother, who
lived in the jurisdiction to which she would move, had agreed
"to subsidize her financially in furthering her education."'"
Obviously, the trial court balanced the facts of the case
and found that due to the negative influence of the ex-husband
and the positive desire on the part of the mother to begin a new
life outside of Kentucky, the move should be allowed. It should
be noted that such a move had not been permitted 9 years
No. 76-38 (June 25, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
'Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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earlier in Brumleve v. Brumleve.'2 However, in Early the Court
distinguished that case on the grounds that there the mother
did not have employment waiting for her when she moved from
the jurisdiction.
It should also be pointed out that the Court in Early em-
phasized the role of the lower court as a fact finder:
The trial court considered all the facts. He found that there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the findings on the motion
for removal of the children. There was no abuse of discretion,
nor were the findings of fact clearly erroneous. CR 52.01.
Therefore, this court will not disturb the trial court's find-
ings.'3
Early obviously reaffirms the principle that great weight will
be given the discretion of the trial court in matters affecting
child custody, visitation privileges, and moving from the juris-
diction. Furthermore, it represents a laudable recognition of
intangible factors such as the desire of the custodial parent "to
start life over," in allowing that parent to move from the juris-
diction.
D. Phillips v. Horlander
The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged
the rights of unwed fathers,14 and this year the Kentucky Su-
preme Court followed suit.'5 In an emphatic decision, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Jones, held that the
putative father of an illegitimate child is entitled to visitation
with the child.
Thus an illegitimate child is often exposed to a hostile envi-
ronment. This may cause the child to develop symptoms of
rejection and inferiority. Every supportive measure must be
employed to protect such a child.
This Court recognizes that in any case involving visita-
tion, neither the fact of illegitimacy nor the personal prefer-
ence or prejudices of the parents should control the court's
decision. The governing criterion and the thread that runs so
2 416 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1967).
, Early v. Early, No. 76-38 (June 25, 1976) (mer. per curiam).
" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
, Phillips v. Horlander, 535 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1975).
19761
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true must always be the welfare and best interests of the
child.'"
Since this was a case of first impression in Kentucky, Jus-
tice Jones introduced cases from other jurisdictions to support
the Court's holding. Significantly, he cited Stanley v. Illinois,"7
a recent case in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the biological father of children born out of wedlock has a
constitutional right to a hearing before his right to custody is
terminated. The Kentucky Court stated:
This court is of the opinion that now is the time to rend the
veil of puritan precepts through which unwed fathers are
viewed as nonpersons. To state as a matter of law that the
visits of the putative father are always detrimental to the
illegitimate child's best interests is to exalt rule over reality.
There is a growing recognition in courts throughout the na-
tion of the need to determine the welfare of each child in light
of his own particular needs and circumstances.
If the biological father of children born out of wedlock
has the constitutional right to a hearing before his right to
custody is terminated, then it would follow that a biological
father of a child born out of wedlock would have the right of
visitation with his child.'8
One might question whether the illegitimate father's new-
found right of visitation in Kentucky actually follows from the
illegitimate father's right to a. hearing before custody of his
children is terminated, but one cannot doubt the wisdom of the
result. The crux of this case is found in the phrase "the welfare
of each child in light of his own particular needs and circum-
stances." The presumption now is that the illegitimate child's
welfare is furthered when the putative father has visitation
rights. The burden is on the custodial parent to show that such
a visitation privilege would be to the child's detriment.
Lest the practitioner become too alarmed at the prospect
of numerous unwed fathers attempting to assert parental rights
over natural children, we hasten to say that the facts of Phillips
are unusual and demonstrate a strong parental tie. This father
,1 Id. at 73-74.
17 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
11 535 S.W.2d at 74.
[Vol. 65
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paid the expenses of the child's birth and made attempts to
support the child and attempts at visitation, all of which were
refused by the mother.
II. ADOPTION
The Commissioner of Child Welfare, in reaching a decision
as to whether a child may be adopted, "shall be guided by the
ability of the persons wishing to receive the child to give the
child a suitable home, and shall at all times consider the best
interest of the child from a financial, medical, psychological
and psychiatric standpoint."' 9 In Department for Human Re-
sources v. Basham,0 the appellees sought to adopt a child, but
were denied permission by the Commissioner of Child Welfare.
The reason for this denial was stated in a letter from the Com-
missioner to the appellees:
This decision is based on the knowledge that Jason's mother
... does not consent to your adopting him and has requested
that he be returned to her. We are also concerned about the
strong possibility of hostile interference by Jason's mother in
your family life in the future, which would not be conducive
to the child's adjustment as a member of your family.2'
The appellees filed an action in circuit court appealing the
Commissioner's decision. The trial judge held that the Com-
missioner's determination was arbitrary and an abuse of discre-
tion because it was based upon factors other than the fitness
of the proposed adoptive parents to adopt the child.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and in so
doing broadened the scope of the applicable statute.22 In the
Court's words, "[T]he issue before us is whether in making the
investigation required by KRS § 199.473(1) the secretary is
confined to an investigation of the suitability of the applicants
as adoptive parents (appellees were found to be suitable) or
whether the secretary may consider other matters which, de-
spite the suitability of the applicants, might adversely affect
" KRS § 199.473(1).
540 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1976).
21 Id.
22 KRS § 199.473(1).
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the adoptive child and not be in its best interest." The Court
found that while the appellees apparently were "eminently
suitable as adoptive parents," other factors affecting the
child's welfare could be considered. 4 In this case the possibility
of hostile interference by the child's natural mother was
deemed sufficient to deny the appellees the privilege of adop-
tion.
II. MODIFICATION OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND CHILD
CUSTODY AwARDS
In Ehrman v. Ehrman25 the trial court modified a 1959
judgment of divorce and alimony, reducing the husband's pay-
ments to nothing, and denying the wife's claim for more ali-
mony. The wife had not sought employment at any time subse-
quent to the grant of the divorce. In making the modification
the trial court had stated:
... [T]he main thrust of the action seems to be whether or
not there has been a change in circumstances sufficient to
render said judgment unconscionable....
It would appear definitely out of character with KRS
403.200 for one spouse to receive an annuity for the rest of his
life, after a relatively short marriage, and refuse to make a
constructive effort to help himself. The unconscionable as-
pect of such an intolerable situation becomes self-evident
after a prolonged period of time and clearly manifests in itself
that there has been a change in circumstances. 6
The Court, however, reversed the trial court for the reason
that the terms of the alimony clause in question were subject
to review under KRS § 403.250, rather than KRS § 403.200.2
3 Department for Human Resources v. Basham, 540 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1976) at 7.
24 Id.
2 No. 75-516 (June 25, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
29 Id.
KRS § 403.200 provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or a pro-
ceeding for maintenance following dissolution of a marriage by a court which
lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a
maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance:
[Vol. 65
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The former statute states in part that a modification will not
be permitted unless the changes are "so substantial and con-
tinuing as to make the terms unconscionable. '28
The husband alleged that the terms were presently un-
conscionable and the wife counterclaimed for an increase in her
alimony. The basis for his complaint was that she had not
bothered to seek employment and had squandered an estate of
$53,000. The basis of the wife's complaint was that her hus-
band's income had increased over $28,000 since they had been
married.
The Court stated:
It is almost incredible to think that a wife must protect her
alimony by going to work and becoming self-supporting,
thereby running the risk of having her payments terminated,
or remaining at home and running the risk of having her
payments terminated because she wouldn't go to work. This
approach to the question is "close akin" to the old game of
"Heads, I win, tails, you lose."29
In refusing to grant the wife's claim for an increase in alimony
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property appor-
tioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment
or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such
periods of time as the court deems just, and after considering all
relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, in-
cluding marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to
meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a
provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum
for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training
to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate em-
ployment;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking mainte-
nance.
KRS § 403.250(1).
" Ehrman v. Ehrman, No. 75-516 (June 25, 1976) (mer. per curiam).
1976]
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due to the husband's increased income, the Court stated, "Fur-
thermore, the mere fact that Frederick's income has increased
would not in itself justify an increase in alimony payments.
The ravages of inflation have taken their toll on both these
parties and blame cannot be assigned to either of them."30
Hence the Court reversed with directions that the alimony al-
lowance as provided in the agreement of January 13, 1959, and
the judgment of January 23, 1959 be reinstated.
An interesting question of retroactivity arose in Scott v.
Scott,3' which involved KRS § 403.180(6). This statute pro-
vides that:
Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visita-
tion of children, the decree may expressly preclude or limit
modification of terms if the separation agreement so pro-
vides. Otherwise, terms of a separation agreement are auto-
matically modified by modification of the decree.32
This statute was directly contrary to the rule previously
adhered to in Kentucky that maintenance provisions which
were an integral part of a full property settlement agreement
could not be modified.3 In Scott one of the critical questions
was whether KRS § 403.180(6) could be applied retroactively
because in this case the judgment incorporating the property
settlement agreement was entered before the statute became
effective. Certainly, as the Court noted, "Subsection (3) of Sec-
tion 26 of the 1972 Act (Chapter 182 of the Acts of 1972) pro-
vides that the Act 'applies to all proceedings commenced after
its effective date for the modification of a judgment or order
entered prior to the effective date of this Act' "
The Court, however, denied the validity of this provision
"to the extent of impairing vested contractual rights. '35 The
reason for this holding was that previous cases had held "that
rights created by contract could not be impaired through modi-
fication by the court, even though the contract had been trans-
30 Id.
31 529 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1975).
32 KRS § 403.180(6).
Richey v. Richey, 389 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1965); Turner v. Ewald, 162 S.W.2d 181
(Ky. 1942); Renick v. Renick, 57 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. 1933).
31 Scott v. Scott, 529 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1975) at 657.
35 Id.
[Vol. 65
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lated into a court judgment. If the courts cannot impair the
contract, neither can the legislature."38
IV. DIVISION OF MARrrAL PROPERTY
A. Brown v. Brown: The Amount of Maintenance
In Brown v. Brown,37 the Court was asked to set aside a
division of marital property. The issues presented included
whether marital property includes funds dissipated for the hus-
band's personal pleasure and certain tax refunds directly re-
lated to earnings during the period of the marriage; whether the
award of maintenance in this case properly conformed to the
mandates of the applicable statutes; and how an award of child
support should be administered.
Brown had spent the sum of $600 for a vacation trip with
his girlfriend. This money had come from his earnings during
the marriage, and the Court held that the sum was includible.
It based its reasoning on the general thrust of KRS § 403.19018
31 Id. (emphasis in original).
No. 75-560 (December 12, 1975) (mem. per curiam).
n KRS § 403.190 provides:
Disposition of property. (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage
or for legal separation, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following
dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court
shall assign each spouse's property to him. It also shall divide the marital
property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions consider-
ing all relevant factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital prop-
erty, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of award-
ing the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
(2) For the purpose of this chapter, "marital property" means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(e) The increase in value of property acquired before the marriage
to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of
the parties during marriage.
19761
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and a case decided 2 years earlier, Barriger v. Barriger,5 in
which the Court affirmed the trial court's inclusion of a part
of a sum which had been subjected to the husband's "profligate
dissipation." 0
The fact that the state and federal tax refunds in question
were directly related to earnings during the period of their mar-
riage was sufficient for the Court to include them as part of the
marital property. Again, the general language of KRS § 403.190
was cited for support.
Insofar as the determination of an amount of maintenance
was concerned, the Court stated that its polestars were KRS §
403.20041 and Chapman v. Chapman.42 The record in Brown
showed that the breakdown of the marriage was caused by
Brown rather than his wife, and that under Chapman "we said
that fault for the marital breakdown is a relevant factor and
may be considered in determining the amount of the mainte-
nance."43
The Court noted that the circuit court's maintenance
award consisted of the husband's assumption of all the house
payments plus all taxes and insurance for the first year, and
thereafter only one-half of the house payment each month, plus
one-half of the taxes and insurance so long as the wife and
children occupied the residence. The Court also noted that the
wife was unemployed and that her health led to an ability only
to hold menial employment. In actuality, the real property
involved was owned jointly by the husband and wife, so that
every mortgage payment increased the husband's equity as
well as the wife's.
Therefore, during the first year Doyle is in reality paying to
Dorothy only one-half of the mortgage, taxes, and insurance,
(3) All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a
decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-
ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the en-
tirety, and community property. The presumption of marital property is
overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed
in subsection (2) of this section.
1, 514 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1974).
40 Id.
"1 See supra note 27.
42 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1974).
13 Brown v. Brown, No. 75-560 (December 12, 1975) (mem. per curiam).
[Vol. 65
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the other one-half he is paying to enhance his own equity.
Thereafter, when Doyle makes one-half of the mortgage pay-
ments, taxes, and insurance, he is in effect only paying his
portion of the obligation on the note which the court, by its
decree had placed on him. On the other hand, during this
subsequent period Dorothy would be paying the other one-
half, for which she is liable.44
It is impossible to say, since there is no clear-cut statement
of a holding, whether the Court intended to hold that when
property is jointly held, maintenance consisting solely of the
payment or partial payment of the mortgage, insurance and
taxes on that property will be inadequate. It is clear, however,
that the facts of this case indicate a willingness on the Court's
part to hold to this result provided that the wife is unable to
contribute financially for her own maintenance. The bottom
line of this case is its insistence that the guidelines of KRS §
403.200 on maintenance, and the holding of Chapman on fault
in determining the amount of maintenance, should guide the
trial court's determination.
The final issue handled by Brown is the manner in which
the determination of child support shall be handled. On this
issue the Court affirmed that it would follow KRS § 403.21045
and consider the financial resources of both the custodial and
the non-custodial parent. Essentially, Brown's importance lies
not only in its holding that dissipated funds earned during the
marriage and income tax refunds directly related to the prop-
erty earned during the marriage are included in the marital
property, but also in its discussion of the statutory provisions
A Id.
Is KRS § 403.210 provides:
Child support. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation,
maintenance, or child support, the court may order either or both parents
owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasona-
ble or necessary for his support, without regard to marital misconduct, after
considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The financial resources of the child;
(2) The financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
marriage not been dissolved;
(4) The physical and emotional condition of the child, and his
educational needs; and
(5) The financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent.
1976]
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concerning the division of marital property, the award of main-
tenance, and the award of child support.
B. Griffin v. Griffin: Division of Marital Property
In this case" the trial court awarded the divorced wife
maintenance in the sum of $10,000 per year and the right to
occupy a house in Florida purchased during the marriage for 5
years and then convey her one-half interest in the house back
to the husband. This judgment by the trial court was based on
the trial court's finding that the wife was primarily at fault due
to an adulterous relationship 8 years earlier, and that her one-
half interest in the marriage was acquired solely by virtue of
the marital relationship.
The Supreme Court reversed this judgment on the grounds
that it was "clearly erroneous." First the Court pointed out
that the division of marital property is not to be done on the
basis of fault. In speaking of KRS § 403.190 which deals with
the division of marital property, the Court stated, "The statute
requires that the court divide the marital property without
regard to marital misconduct. . .. "I'
Furthermore, the Court found that the award of mainte-
nance by the trial court was insufficient due to the wife's ina-
bility to work thereafter because of poor health, and the trial
court's failure to consider any of the relevant facts set forth in
KRS § 403.200 to be used to determine an award of mainte-
nance. Note the distinction between Griffin,4" which stated
that fault is not to be examined in the division of marital
property, and Brown, which reaffirmed a previously enunci-
ated principle that fault could be examined in determining the
amount of maintenance, though not the award of.maintenance
itself.
" Griffin v. Griffin, No. 74-844 (March 19, 1976) (mem. per curiam).
47 Id.
48 Id.
[Vol. 65
